An Improved Asymptotic Key Rate Bound for a Mediated Semi-Quantum Key
  Distribution Protocol by Krawec, Walter O.
An Improved Asymptotic Key Rate Bound for a
Mediated Semi-Quantum Key Distribution
Protocol
Walter O. Krawec
Iona College
New Rochelle, NY 10801 USA
walter.krawec@gmail.com
October 11, 2018
Abstract
Semi-quantum key distribution (SQKD) protocols allow for the estab-
lishment of a secret key between two users Alice and Bob, when one of
the two users (typically Bob) is limited or “classical” in nature. Recently
it was shown that protocols exists when both parties are limited/classical
in nature if they utilize the services of a quantum server. These protocols
are called mediated SQKD protocols. This server, however, is untrusted
and, in fact, adversarial. In this paper, we reconsider a mediated SQKD
protocol and derive a new proof of unconditional security for it. In par-
ticular, we derive a new lower bound on its key rate in the asymptotic
scenario. Furthermore, we show this new lower bound is an improvement
over prior work, thus showing that the protocol in question can tolerate
higher rates of error than previously thought.
1 Introduction
Quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols are designed to allow two users,
Alice (A) and Bob (B), to establish a shared secret key, secure against even
an all-powerful adversary Eve (E). Since the creation, in 1984, of the BB84
protocol [1], there have been several protocols developed which achieve this
end. For a general survey, the reader is referred to [2].
Semi-quantum key distribution (SQKD) protocols, first introduced in 2007
by Boyer et al., [3], have the same goal: the establishment of a secret key,
secure against an all-powerful adversary. However now, instead of allowing
both A and B to manipulate quantum resources (e.g., prepare and measure
qubits in a variety of bases) as is permissible in a typical QKD protocol, only
A is allowed such liberties while B is limited to performing certain “classical”
or “semi-quantum” operations (what operations B is limited to are discussed
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shortly). In this scenario, A is called the quantum user while B is called the
classical user (in a fully quantum protocol, such as BB84[1], both A and B are
fully quantum). Such protocols are theoretically interesting as they attempt to
answer the question “how quantum does a protocol need to be in order to gain
an advantage over a classical one?” [3, 4]
These SQKD protocols, by necessity, rely on a two-way quantum communi-
cation channel - one which permits a qubit to travel from the quantum user A,
to the classical user B, then back to A. The limited classical B, upon receiving
a qubit, is able to do one of two things: he may measure and resend the qubit
or reflect the qubit. Measuring and resending involves taking the qubit received
from A and subjecting it to a Z basis measurement (the Z basis being {|0〉 , |1〉}).
His result |r〉, for r ∈ {0, 1} is then resent to A. Reflecting the qubit involves B
allowing the qubit to simply pass through his lab undistributed in which case
he learns nothing about its state. Thus, the classical user is only able to work
directly with the computational Z basis - he cannot, for example, perform a
measurement in the Hadamard X basis (denoted {|±〉 = 1/√2(|0〉 ± |1〉)}).
This two-way quantum channel, of course, greatly complicates the security
analysis of these protocols as the attacker E is allowed two opportunities to
interact with the traveling qubit. While several SQKD protocols have been
proposed [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9], up until recently, the bulk of security proofs for such
semi-quantum protocols have focused on the notion of robustness. This property,
introduced in [3, 4], requires that any attack which causes E to potentially gain
information, by necessity causes a disturbance which A and B, with non-zero
probability, may detect. Note that robustness says nothing about the amount of
information gained (which may be high) nor the probability of detection (which
may be low).
Recently, some work has been accomplished moving beyond robustness. In
particular [10] derived expressions relating the disturbance of E’s attack to
her information gain for the SQKD protocol of [3], assuming she is limited to
performing individual attacks (those attacks where E is limited to performing
the same attack operation each iteration of the protocol and is forced to measure
her quantum memory before A and B utilize their key for any purpose - these are
weaker attacks than collective attacks - where E performs the same operation
each iteration but can postpone her measurement until any future time of her
choice - and general attacks - those attacks where E is allowed to do anything
within the laws of physics; the reader is referred to [2] for more information on
these possible attack models). Also, [8] described a new SQKD protocol and
computed a similar relation between the disturbance and information gain of
E’s attack, though again assuming individual attacks.
Our work recently has been in the proof of unconditional security (making
no assumptions on the type of attack E uses) of several SQKD protocols. In
particular, in [11], we proved the security of Boyer et al.,’s original SQKD pro-
tocol [3] showing that A and B are able to distill a secure secret key so long
as the noise in the channel is less than 5.34%. We have also, in [7], derived
a series of security results for single state SQKD protocols (single state proto-
cols were introduced in [12], though without proofs of unconditional security).
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While that particular work stopped short of unconditional security proofs, the
security results we prove there can be applied toward that goal [13].
Finally, and also the topic of this current paper, in [14], we designed a
new mediated SQKD protocol. Such a protocol allows two limited classical
users A and B to establish a secure secret key with the help of a quantum
server (denoted C for “Center”). With such a system, one could envision a
QKD infrastructure consisting of several limited “classical” users, utilizing the
services of this quantum server in order to distill secret keys (each key known
only to a pair of classical users, not the server). If the quantum server C were
honest, such a goal would be trivial. Instead, we assumed the server is untrusted
- indeed, we can assume the server is the all-powerful quantum adversary.
In our original work in [14], we proved our mediated protocol’s unconditional
security by computing a lower bound on its key rate (to be defined shortly,
roughly speaking, the key rate is the ratio of the number of secret key bits to
the number of qubits sent) in the asymptotic scenario (as the number of qubits
sent approaches infinity). We showed that, if the server is “semi-honest,” that is
the server follows our protocol correctly but afterwards tries to learn something
about the key, then A and B may distill a secret key so long as the noise in the
channel is less than 19.9%. If the server is fully adversarial (that is, the server
does not follow the protocol and instead performs any operations he likes within
the laws of quantum physics), then A and B may distill a secret key so long as
the noise in the channel is less than 10.65% (a number that is close to BB84’s
11% [15]).
In this paper, we reconsider our security proof and improve on these toler-
ated noise levels by computing a new bound on the protocol’s key rate using an
alternative method of proof. In our original proof, we utilized a bound on the
Jensen-Shannon Divergence from [16] to find bounds on the quantum mutual
information between A and C’s system. Here, we will use a technique adapted
from [17] (which we also successfully applied in our proof of security for a dif-
ferent SQKD protocol in [11]) which allows us to bound the conditional von
Neumann entropy between A and C’s system. This new technique provides a
far more optimistic bound. Indeed, as we will see, if the server is semi-honest,
using our new key rate bound in this paper, we will see that A and B may distill
a secret key so long as the noise in the quantum channel is less than 22.05%.
If the server C is adversarial, then we can withstand up to 12.5%. Further-
more, our new proof of security does not make any assumptions concerning the
symmetry of E’s attack as was done in our original proof.
Thus the contributions of this paper are two-fold. First, we improve our
original security proof finding a more optimistic bound on our mediated SQKD
protocol’s tolerated noise level. Our new proof in this paper also requires fewer
assumptions. Secondly, we describe an alternative proof method, which as we’ve
already shown in [11], can be applied to other semi-quantum protocols (and
perhaps other QKD protocols utilizing a two-way channel). We also show how
this alternative method can produce more optimistic bounds than produced
by bounding the Jensen-Shannon divergence as done in our original proof [14].
Thus, this observation can be useful in other QKD protocol proofs and, per-
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haps, may lead to insight into various quantum information theoretic bounds.
Furthermore, it may be possible to adapt the techniques we use in this proof to
work with other QKD protocols which utilize a two-way quantum communica-
tion channel.
2 The Protocol
We now review the mediated protocol of [14]. This protocol is designed to allow
two classical users A and B (users who can only measure and resend in the Z
basis or reflect qubits) to distill a secret key, known only to themselves, with
the help of a quantum server C. Note that, since A and B can only make Z
basis measurements, they must rely on the server to perform measurements in
alternative bases. However, neither A nor B trust C; indeed we will prove the
security of this protocol assuming C is adversarial. Since this paper is concerned
only with devising an improved key rate bound, we do not alter the protocol in
any way.
This mediated protocol assumes the existence of a quantum communication
channel connecting Alice (A) to the server C and Bob (B) to C. We do not
require a quantum channel directly connecting A and B. Besides this, we assume
an authenticated classical channel connects A and B. The server C, and indeed
any other third party eavesdropper, may listen to the messages sent on this
channel, but they may not send messages of their own. Finally, we assume a
classical channel connects the server to either A or B (or both). See Figure 1.
Using similar arguments as in [14], this channel connecting C to A or B need not
be authenticated; though, indeed, better security bounds may be achieved if it
is authenticated as we discuss later. We will assume that any message sent from
C is received by both parties. That is, C cannot send two different messages
mA 6= mB to A, respectively B, without being caught. Such a mechanism is
easy to achieve: any message sent from C to A (or B) is then forwarded by A
(or B) to the other honest party B (or A) using the authenticated channel.
Our protocol will utilize the Bell basis, the states of which we denote:
|Φ+〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉)
|Φ−〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 − |11〉)
|Ψ+〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉+ |10〉)
|Ψ−〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉 − |10〉)
We first describe the protocol assuming an honest server C. The quantum
communication stage of our protocol repeats the following process:
1. C prepares |Φ+〉, sending one qubit to A, the other to B.
4
Figure 1: A diagram of the scenario we consider. Here, A and B are the honest,
classical users who wish to establish a secret key; E is a third party eavesdropper;
and C is the untrusted, potentially adversarial quantum server. A quantum
channel (the parallel lines in the center of the diagram) connects C to A and also
C to B; these channels pass through the third party eavesdropper (which may
be a single entity or two separate entities). An authenticated classical channel
connects A to B (the dotted line); only A and B may write to this channel,
however all parties can read from it. Finally a classical channel connects the
server C to A and B; this channel is not necessarily authenticated and the
eavesdroppers may write their own messages on it.
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2. A and B (the classical users) choose, independently of each other, to either
reflect the qubit back to C or to measure and resend it. If they measure
in the Z basis and resend, they save their measurement results as their
potential raw key bit. However, A and B do not yet reveal their choice of
operation.
3. Regardless of A and B’s choice, C will receive two qubits back from them.
C then performs a Bell measurement. If this measurement produces the
result |Φ−〉, C sends the message “−1” to both A and B using the clas-
sical channel. Otherwise, for all other measurement results, C sends the
message “+1”.
4. A and B now divulge, using the authenticated classical channel, their
choice in step 2 (but not their measurement results). If A and B both
measure and resent, and if C sends the message “−1”, they will accept this
iteration; that is to say, they will both use this iteration’s measurement
results to contribute towards their raw key. They will not accept this
iteration (i.e., it will not be used to contribute to the raw key) if C sent
the message “+1”. Otherwise, if A and B both reflected, it should be the
case that C sends “+1”; any other message by C is counted as an error.
All other cases are discarded.
Assuming an honest C and the lack of any channel noise or third-party
eavesdropper, it is clear that the above protocol is correct (i.e., A and B will
agree on the same raw key). Indeed, if A and B both reflect, the state arriving
back to C on step 3 is |Φ+〉; thus C should always respond with the message
“+1”. Alternatively, if A and B both measure and resend, the state arriving
at C is |i, i〉 (where i ∈ {0, 1} is A and B’s measurement result and potential
raw key bit for this iteration). C will then perform a Bell basis measurement
(projecting the state into one of the Bell basis states). This measurement results
in outcome |Φ+〉 or |Φ−〉 each with probability 1/2. Only if C reports “−1”
(i.e., he measures |Φ−〉) will A and B use their measurement results “i” as their
raw key bit. (Note that if they also use those iterations where C sends “+1”,
this opens a potential easy attack strategy for C: he can always measure in the
computational basis and send “+1” each iteration.)
Let pM be the probability that A or B measure and resend. Note that,
without noise and assuming an honest C, only pMpM/2 = p
2
M/2 iterations are
expected to be accepted. However, to improve efficiency, we may use a technique
from [18] (which was meant to improve the key rate of the BB84 protocol).
Namely, we may set pM arbitrarily close to 1. Thus, in the asymptotic scenario,
we can expect 1/2 of the qubits sent to contribute to the raw key. It is an open
question as to whether or not a mediated SQKD protocol can be designed which
improves this rate to something larger than 1/2.
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3 Security Proof
While this protocol’s unconditional security was proven in [14], we will now
provide an alternative proof of security which, as we demonstrate later, provides
a more optimistic lower bound on the protocol’s key rate (we will define the key
rate in the asymptotic scenario shortly). Note that, to prove the security of this
protocol, we must not only consider an adversarial C, but also the existence of
third-party, all-powerful eavesdroppers (as shown in Figure 1).
Our proof will work in stages: we will first prove security against an adver-
sarial C, assuming C is limited to collective attacks (those where he performs
the same attack operation each iteration, but, unlike with an independent attack
discussed earlier, he is free to postpone the measurement of his quantum mem-
ory until any future time of his choice) and assuming there are no third-party
eavesdroppers. Following this, we will prove security against general attacks
(those attacks where no assumptions are made other than C follows the laws of
physics) and assuming the existence of third-party eavesdroppers.
3.1 Notation
We denote by H(·) the Shannon entropy function. Given a set {p1, p2, · · · , pn}
where
∑
i pi = 1 and pi ≥ 0, then:
H(p1, p2, · · · , pn) = −
n∑
i=1
pi log pi,
where all logarithms in this paper are base two unless otherwise specified. We
will occasionally use the notational shortcutH({pi}i) to meanH(p1, p2, · · · , pn).
Furthermore, when n = 2 (which forces p2 = 1− p1), we will occasionally write
h(p1) to mean H(p1, p2).
Given a density operator ρ, we write S(ρ) to be its von Neumann entropy.
Let {λ1, λ2, · · · , λn} be the eigenvalues of finite dimensional ρ. Then S(ρ) =
−∑i λi log λi.
When ρ acts on a bipartite system HA⊗HB , we will often write ρAB . Then,
later, if we write ρA we take that to mean the result of tracing out the HB
portion of ρAB (i.e., ρA = trBρAB). Similarly for ρB . Similarly, for multi-
partite systems (e.g., ρABC acts on a tripartite system and ρBC = trAρABC).
Given ρAB , we write S(AB) to mean S(ρAB) and S(B) to mean S(ρB).
Finally, we write S(A|B) to be the conditional von Neumann entropy defined:
S(A|B) = S(AB)− S(B) = S(ρAB)− S(ρB).
3.2 Modeling the Protocol
For now, we will consider only an adversarial center C and not third-party
eavesdroppers. That is, the system in question consists only of A, B, and C
and no one else (the case when there are third-party attackers will be considered
later). We will also assume C employs collective attacks. Assuming this, a single
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iteration of our protocol may be described as a closed system in the Hilbert
space:
H = HA ⊗HB ⊗HTA ⊗HTB ⊗HC ⊗Hcl,
where:
• HA and HB are A and B’s private registers storing their raw key bit.
• HTA and HTB are two dimensional spaces modeling the qubit channel
connecting C to A and C to B respectively (they are the transit space).
• HC is C’s private quantum system.
• Hcl is a two-dimensional subspace, spanned by orthonormal basis {|+1〉 , |−1〉}
used to model the classical message C sends on this iteration.
We model the protocol in the same way as in [14], the details of which
we now quickly review. At start, C, who we now assume is fully adversarial,
prepares, not necessarily |Φ+〉 as prescribed by the protocol, but instead the
state |φ0〉 =
∑
i,j αi,j |i, j〉TA,TB⊗|ci,j〉 where the |ci,j〉 are arbitrary normalized,
though not necessarily orthogonal, states in HC .
As shown in our original proof, there is no advantage to C in sending the
above state, versus sending the far simpler state: |ψ0〉 =
∑
i,j αi,j |i, j〉TA,TB .
That is, there is no advantage to C in preparing a state, on step (1) of the
protocol, that is entangled with his private quantum memory. The proof of
this, which may be found in [14], uses a technique introduced in [7]. Thus,
when analyzing the security of this protocol, we may assume the state C sends
is unentangled with HC .
Following A and B’s operation (either measuring and resending, or reflect-
ing), the qubits return to C. The server, C, is now permitted to perform any
operation of his choice, potentially entangling the qubits with his private quan-
tum memory. Since he must also send a single classical bit to both A and B
(from our earlier discussion, it is impossible for C to send different messages to
A and B thus we may assume he sends only a single message and it is received
by both), his attack is modeled as a quantum instrument [19] I which acts on
density operator ρ = ρTATBC as follows:
I(ρ) = |+1〉 〈+1|cl ⊗
N0∑
i=1
Ei,0ρE
∗
i,0 + |−1〉 〈−1|cl ⊗
N1∑
i=1
Ei,1ρE
∗
i,1, (1)
where the Ei,j satisfy:
N0∑
i=1
E∗i,0Ei,0 +
N1∑
i=1
E∗i,1Ei,1 = I.
(Above, I is the identity operator.)
We may assume, without loss of generality that N0 and N1 are both finite.
Finally, it can be shown (see [14] for details) that this attack may be represented,
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without loss of power to C, by a unitary operator U = UI acting on a larger,
though still finite dimensional, Hilbert space. Providing C with this larger space
potentially increases his power, thus providing us with a lower bound on the
security of our protocol. Working with unitary attack operators turns out to be
far simpler than working with attacks of the form in Equation 1.
This unitary attack operator, U , acts on HTA ⊗HTB ⊗HC ⊗Hcl, where HC
has been suitably expanded. After A and B’s operation, C will apply unitary
U . C will then perform a projective measurement on the Hcl system in the
{|+1〉 , |−1〉} basis. This measurement determines the message he sends. The
post-measurement state represents the state of his ancilla in the event he sends
that particular message. Such a procedure is mathematically equivalent to his
use of I as proven in [14].
Clearly, a single iteration of the protocol, conditioning on the event the
iteration is accepted (i.e., A and B both measure and resend, and C sends
“−1”) may be described by a density operator of the form:
ρABC =
∑
i,j
pi,j |i, j〉 〈i, j|AB ⊗ σ(i,j)C ,
where pi,j is the probability that A and B’s raw key bit is i and j respectively
and σ
(i,j)
C is the state of C’s quantum memory in that event.
Following N iterations of the quantum communication stage, assuming col-
lective attacks, the overall system is in the state ρ⊗NABC . A and B will then
perform parameter estimation, error correction, and privacy amplification pro-
tocols (see [2] for more information on these, now standard, processes) resulting
in a secret key of size `(N) ≤ N (possibly `(N) = 0 if C has too much infor-
mation on the raw key). We are interested in the ratio of secret key bits to raw
key bits as the latter approaches infinity; that is, we are interested in the key
rate, denoted r, in the asymptotic scenario [2]:
r = lim
N→∞
`(N)
N
.
For a state of the form ρ⊗N , it was shown in [20, 15, 21] that the key rate
is:
r = inf(I(A : B)− I(A : C)) = inf(S(A|C)− S(A|B)). (2)
Here I(A : B) is the (classical) mutual information held between A and B’s
system; I(A : C) is the quantum mutual information between A and C; the
conditional entropy S(A|C) was defined earlier in the notation section; H(A|B)
is the conditional Shannon entropy defined: H(A|B) = H(AB)−H(B). Finally,
the infimum is over all attack operators which induce the observed statistics
(e.g., the observed error rate).
Note that the first equation, involving mutual information, is due to [20],
the second, equivalent version, is from [15, 21] (showing the two are equal is
trivial). While in our previous paper [14], we used the key rate equation based on
mutual information, in this paper we will bound r by bounding the conditional
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entropy. Though these two equations produce equal results, the technique we
use to bound the latter, as we show in this paper, allows us to provide a more
optimistic lower bound on r.
3.3 The New Key Rate Bound
We must now describe the state of A, B, and C’s system after a single iteration
of the protocol, conditioning on the event that this iteration is used to contribute
towards the raw key (i.e., both A and B measure and resend, and C sends “−1”).
Let |ψ0〉 =
∑
i,j αi,j |i, j〉TA,TB be the initial state prepared and sent by C (from
our earlier discussion this is without loss of generality), where the qubit TA is
sent to A and the qubit TB is sent to B. Now, assume both A and B measure
and resend (other cases, though potentially useful for parameter estimation, do
not contribute towards the raw key and thus are not considered for the time
being). After A and B’s measure and resend operation, the state is clearly:
ρ1 =
∑
i,j∈{0,1}
|αi,j |2 |i, j〉 〈i, j|A,B ⊗ |i, j〉 〈i, j|TA,TB .
At this point, the transit system returns to C’s control where he will perform
an arbitrary, without loss of generality unitary, operator acting on HTA⊗HTB⊗
HC⊗Hcl (since we are working with collective attacks, the latter two subspaces
are assumed to be cleared to some “zero” state). We write U ’s action on basis
states as follows:
|i, j〉 U7→ |+1, ei,j〉+ |−1, fi,j〉 , (3)
where |ei,j〉 and |fi,j〉 are arbitrary, not necessarily normalized nor orthogonal,
states in HTA ⊗HTB ⊗HC . Unitarity of U imposes various restrictions on these
states which will become important later in our analysis. Note that, unlike our
analysis in our original paper, we do not make any symmetry assumptions at
this point.
Following C’s operation, and conditioning on the event that C sends “−1” (if
C sends “+1” the iteration is discarded and thus does not contribute to the raw
key - though such iterations will be important later for parameter estimation as
we discuss shortly), the final state is:
ρABC =
1
pa
∑
i,j
|αi,j |2 |i, j〉 〈i, j|AB ⊗ |fi,j〉 〈fi,j |C , (4)
where:
pa =
∑
i,j
|αi,j |2 〈fi,j |fi,j〉 . (5)
(Note that we have disregarded the Hcl portion of the above state as it is
projected to |−1〉 〈−1|cl and thus not needed; we have also abused notation
slightly by “absorbing” the HTA ⊗HTB subspaces into HC .
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Our goal is to compute a bound on S(A|C)−H(A|B). We will first bound
S(A|C). However, the high dimensionality of the system proves a hinderance.
To overcome this, we will employ a technique first proposed in [17], and later
adapted successfully by us, to the key rate computation of a different (not
a mediated) SQKD protocol in [11]. This technique requires us to condition
on a new random variable of our choice. By appending a carefully chosen
auxiliary system, we can simplify the entropy computations. Due to the strong
sub additivity of von Neumann entropy, it holds that, for any tripartite system
HA ⊗HC ⊗HX , we have:
S(A|C) ≥ S(A|CX) =⇒ S(A|C)−H(A|B) ≥ S(A|CX)−H(A|B),
thus allowing us to find a lower bound on the key rate of this mediated SQKD
protocol. Appending this system HX and providing C access to it, though
unrealistic, does allow us to compute a lower bound on the key rate; the realistic
case, then, where C does not have this additional information HX can only be
better for A and B.
The system we append, denoted HX , is two-dimensional and spanned by
orthonormal basis states {|C〉 , |W 〉} where |C〉 will be used to denote the event
that A and B’s raw key bit is correct, while |W 〉 will be used to describe the
event that their raw key bits are wrong.
Incorporating this system into ρABC yields the state:
ρABCX =
1
pa
|C〉 〈C| ⊗ (|α0,0|2 |0, 0〉 〈0, 0|AB ⊗ |f0,0〉 〈f0,0| (6)
+|α1,1|2 |1, 1〉 〈1, 1|AB ⊗ |f1,1〉 〈f1,1|
)
+
1
pa
|W 〉 〈W | ⊗ (|α0,1|2 |0, 1〉 〈0, 1|AB ⊗ |f0,1〉 〈f0,1|
+|α1,0|2 |1, 0〉 〈1, 0|AB ⊗ |f1,0〉 〈f1,0|
)
.
Given such a state, we may more readily compute S(A|CX) = S(ACX) −
S(CX). Indeed, it is not difficult to see that:
S(ACX) = H
({
1
pa
|αi,j |2 〈fi,j |fi,j〉
}
i,j
)
. (7)
(Choosing a suitable basis, we may write ρACX - which is the result of tracing
out B from Equation 6 - as a diagonal matrix with diagonal elements equal to
1
pa
|αi,j |2 〈fi,j |fi,j〉.)
We must now compute an upper bound on S(CX) which will provide us
with a lower bound on the key rate equation. Indeed, if S(CX) ≤ η then
S(A|C) ≥ S(A|CX) ≥ S(ACX)− η.
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Define the following:
pC =
1
pa
(|α0,0|2 〈f0,0|f0,0〉+ |α1,1|2 〈f1,1|f1,1〉) (8)
pW =
1
pa
(|α0,1|2 〈f0,1|f0,1〉+ |α1,0|2 〈f1,0|f1,0〉). (9)
Clearly, pC is the probability that A and B’s raw key bit is correct (they match)
while pW is the probability that they are wrong. For the following, assume that
both pC and pW are both strictly positive. The case when pW is zero is similar
as we will comment later. Of course if pC = 0 then there is far too much noise
and A and B should abort. (If pC = 0 all their key bits are wrong!) Note that
pC and pW are parameters that may be estimated by A and B. Also note that A
and B may estimate the quantities 〈fi,j |fi,j〉 which are simply the probabilities
that C sends “−1” in the event A and B both measure and resend |i, j〉.
Tracing out A and B from Equation 6 yields:
ρCX =
1
pa
|C〉 〈C| ⊗ (|α0,0|2 |f0,0〉 〈f0,0|+ |α1,1|2 |f1,1〉 〈f1,1|) (10)
+
1
pa
|W 〉 〈W | ⊗ (|α0,1|2 |f0,1〉 〈f0,1|+ |α1,0|2 |f1,0〉 〈f1,0|) .
= pC |C〉 〈C| ⊗ σC + pW |W 〉 〈W | ⊗ σW ,
where σx are the following (unit trace - recall we are assuming for now that
both pC and pW are non-zero) density operators:
σC =
|α0,0|2 |f0,0〉 〈f0,0|+ |α1,1|2 |f1,1〉 〈f1,1|
|α0,0|2 〈f0,0|f0,0〉+ |α1,1|2 〈f1,1|f1,1〉 . (11)
σW =
|α0,1|2 |f0,1〉 〈f0,1|+ |α1,0|2 |f1,0〉 〈f1,0|
|α0,1|2 〈f0,1|f0,1〉+ |α1,0|2 〈f1,0|f1,0〉 . (12)
It is not difficult to show (see, for instance, [11] for a proof) that the entropy
of such a system is simply:
S(CX) = H(pC , pW ) + pWS(σW ) + pCS(σC)
≤ H(pC , pW ) + pW + pCS(σC). (13)
The inequality above follows from the fact that S(σW ) ≤ log dimσW . Since σC
and σW are both two-dimensional, S(σW ) ≤ 1. Note that it is not difficult to
show that if pW = 0, then |α0,1|2 |f0,1〉 〈f0,1|+ |α1,0|2 |f1,0〉 〈f1,0| ≡ 0. Thus, this
term does not appear in Equation 10, and so the bound in Equation 13 holds
even in this case.
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Obviously if the noise is small, than pW should also be small. All that
remains, therefore, is to upper bound S(σC).
We may write, without loss of generality, |f0,0〉 = x |f〉 and |f1,1〉 = y |f〉 +
z |ζ〉, where 〈f |f〉 = 〈ζ|ζ〉 = 1, 〈f |ζ〉 = 0, and x, y, z ∈ C. This of course implies:
|x|2 = 〈f0,0|f0,0〉 (14)
|y|2 + |z|2 = 〈f1,1|f1,1〉 (15)
x∗y = 〈f0,0|f1,1〉 =⇒ |y|2 = | 〈f0,0|f1,1〉 |2/|x|2. (16)
Using this {|f〉 , |ζ〉} basis, we may write σC as:
σC = q0
 |α0,0|2|x|2 + |α1,1|2|y|2 , |α1,1|2y∗z
|α1,1|2yz∗ , |α1,1|2|z|2
 ,
where:
q0 = (|α0,0|2 〈f0,0|f0,0〉+|α1,1|2 〈f1,1|f1,1〉)−1 = [|α0,0|2|x|2+|α1,1|2(|y|2+|z|2)]−1.
The eigenvalues of this matrix are easily computed to be:
λ± =
1
2
± q0
2
√
(|α0,0|2|x|2 + |α1,1|2|y|2 − |α1,1|2|z|2)2 + 4|α1,1|4|y|2|z|2
=
1
2
± q0
2
√
(|α0,0|2F0,0 + |α1,1|2[2|y|2 − F1,1])2 + 4|α1,1|4|y|2(F1,1 − |y|2),
where above we have defined Fi,i = 〈fi,i|fi,i〉 and have used the identities 14
and 15. Now, define ∆ = |α0,0|2F0,0 − |α1,1|2F1,1 and, continuing, we have:
λ± =
1
2
± q0
2
√
(∆ + 2|α1,1|2|y|2)2 + 4|α1,1|4|y|2F1,1 − 4|α1,1|4|y|4
=
1
2
± q0
2
√
∆2 + 4|α1,1|2|y|2 (∆ + |α1,1|2F1,1)
=
1
2
± q0
2
√
∆2 + 4|α1,1|2|y|2|α0,0|2|x|2.
Finally, using identity 16 (and that |x|2 = F0,0), we have:
λ± =
1
2
± q0
2
√
∆2 + 4|α0,0|2|α1,1|2| 〈f0,0|f1,1〉 |2 (17)
Note that ∆, q0, |α0,0|2, and |α1,1|2 are all parameters that A and B may
estimate. Computing a bound on | 〈f0,0|f1,1〉 |2 may be achieved using the error
rate when both A and B reflect as we demonstrate later.
Combining everything together yields the bound:
S(A|C) ≥ H
({
1
pa
|αi,j |2 〈fi,j |fi,j〉
}
i,j
)
−H(pC , pW )− pW − pCH(λ+, λ−).
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Note that H(λ+, λ−) = h(λ+) takes its maximum when λ+ = 12 . It is not
difficult to see that, as | 〈f0,0|f1,1〉 |2 ≥ 0 increases, λ+ increases. Furthermore,
when | 〈f0,0|f1,1〉 |2 = 0, λ+ ≥ 12 . Thus, as | 〈f0,0|f1,1〉 |2 increases, h(λ+) neces-
sarily decreases. By finding a lower-bound F (which will be a function of certain
observed parameters as we will soon discuss) such that | 〈f0,0|f1,1〉 |2 ≥ F , we
will have an upper-bound on h(λ+) and thus a lower bound on S(A|CX). That
is to say, if we define:
λ˜ =
1
2
+
q0
2
√
∆2 + 4|α0,0|2|α1,1|2F , (18)
then:
1
2
≤ λ˜ ≤ λ+ =⇒ h(λ+) ≤ h(λ˜),
This implies:
S(A|C) ≥ H
({
1
pa
|αi,j |2 〈fi,j |fi,j〉
}
i,j
)
−H(pC , pW )− pW − pCh(λ˜). (19)
This concludes our bound on S(A|C). Determining a bound on F (needed
to bound h(λ+)) can be easily determined from the probability that C sends
“−1” if both A and B reflect (note that C should send “+1” if they both reflect
- C sending “−1” in this event is counted as an error). In the next section, we
will demonstrate this in two specific cases comparing our new result with our
older one from [14].
Of course, computing H(A|B), the last remaining term from the key rate
equation, is easy after parameter estimation. Indeed, let p(a, b) be the proba-
bility of A’s raw key bit being a and B’s raw key bit being b. From Equation
4, we see these values are:
p(i, j) =
1
pa
|αi,j |2 〈fi,j |fi,j〉 (20)
Also, if we let p(b) be the probability that B’s raw key bit is b (i.e., p(b) =
p(0, b) + p(1, b)) then our final key rate bound is found to be:
r ≥ H
({
1
pa
|αi,j |2 〈fi,j |fi,j〉
}
i,j
)
−H(pC , pW )− pW − pCh(λ˜)
−H ({p(a, b)}a,b) + h(p(0)).
Using Equation 20, this can be simplified to:
r ≥ h(p(0))−H(pC , pW )− pW − pCh(λ˜) (21)
Note that all terms in the above expression, with the exception of λ˜, are
directly observable by A and B. Indeed, |αi,j |2 is simply the probability that
A and B measure |i, j〉. The quantity 〈fi,j |fi,j〉 is the probability that C sends
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“−1” in the event A and B measure and resend |i, j〉. If A and B divulge
complete information about certain randomly chosen iterations (in particular
their choices and measurement results if applicable), this information is easily
estimated. The only parameter that cannot be directly observed is λ˜; in par-
ticular the quantity | 〈f0,0|f1,1〉 |2 upon which that eigenvalue depends. They
may, however, estimate it using the probability that C sends “−1” if A and B
both reflect (the probability of which A and B may estimate). We will show
how this is done in the next section when we actually evaluate the above key
rate expression for certain scenarios.
3.4 General Attacks and Third Party Eavesdroppers
We considered only collective attacks above. However, if A and B permute their
raw key bits, using a randomly chosen (and publicly disclosed) permutation, the
protocol becomes permutation invariant [15]. Thus the results in [22, 23] apply
showing that, to prove security against general attacks (where C is allowed to
perform any operation of his choice - perhaps altering his attack operator each
iteration) it is sufficient to prove security against collective attacks. Further-
more, since we are considering the asymptotic scenario in this paper, our key
rate bound is equivalent in both cases.
Finally, it is clear that any attack by a third-party eavesdropper (including
attacks whereby the eavesdropper alters C’s classical messages - recall that
channel is not authenticated) can simply be “absorbed” into C’s attack operator
U . Thus our bound holds even in this case.
4 Evaluation
Our key rate bound applies in the most general of cases. A and B must simply
observe certain parameters and, based on these, they may determine a lower
bound on their secret key fraction (bounding | 〈f0,0|f1,1〉 |2 may also be achieved
using these parameters as we discuss shortly). Of course, due to its reliance
on many parameters, it is difficult to visualize this bound here in this paper.
However, we may consider certain scenarios which A and B may encounter
and evaluate our bound based on these particular scenarios. First, we will
consider the case of a semi-honest server and a noisy quantum channel. Later
we will consider an adversarial server whose attack is “symmetric” (a common
assumption in QKD security proofs). These two scenarios were considered in
our earlier work [14] and so will allow us to compare our new results with our
old showing the superiority of our new bound in both of these scenarios.
4.1 Bounding | 〈f0,0|f1,1〉 |2
We now show how to bound the quantity | 〈f0,0|f1,1〉 |2 based on the probability
that C sends “−1” if A and B had sent the Bell state |Φ+〉 to C. Obviously
this is not a parameter that is directly observable (A and B are classical and
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so cannot prepare |Φ+〉). However, it may be bounded, as we show later, using
the error rate in those iterations where A and B reflected (i.e., the probability
that C sends “−1” if A and B both reflect).
Consider the action of C’s attack operator U on Bell basis states. This is:
U |Φ+〉 = |+1, g0〉+ |−1, h0〉
U |Φ−〉 = |+1, g1〉+ |−1, h1〉
U |Ψ+〉 = |+1, g2〉+ |−1, h2〉
U |Ψ−〉 = |+1, g3〉+ |−1, h3〉 ,
where each |gi〉 and |hi〉 are linear functions of |ek,l〉 and |fk,l〉 respectively (see
Equation 3). In particular, we have |h0〉 = 1√2 (|f0,0〉+ |f1,1〉). Imagine, for the
time, that, in addition to the other parameters mentioned in the last section, A
and B are also able to estimate the parameter 〈h0|h0〉:
〈h0|h0〉 = 1
2
(〈f0,0|f0,0〉+ 〈f1,1|f1,1〉+ 2Re 〈f0,0|f1,1〉). (22)
This then provides an estimate of | 〈f0,0|f1,1〉 |2. Indeed, if Re 〈f0,0|f1,1〉 = x,
then of course | 〈f0,0|f1,1〉 |2 = Re2 〈f0,0|f1,1〉+Im2 〈f0,0|f1,1〉 ≥ Re2 〈f0,0|f1,1〉 =
|x|2. Thus:
〈h0|h0〉 = η
⇒ | 〈f0,0|f1,1〉 |2 ≥
(
1
2
〈f0,0|f0,0〉+ 1
2
〈f1,1|f1,1〉 − η
)2
. (23)
This quantity 〈h0|h0〉 is simply the probability that C sends “−1” if A and
B jointly send the state |Φ+〉 (this should be small). Obviously they cannot
estimate this parameter directly in reality (they are neither of them quantum).
However, as we will show later, they are able to compute an upper bound on it.
In particular, if they bound 〈h0|h0〉 ≤ η, then, for η small enough (and recall it
should be small since C is supposed to send “+1” if he receives |Φ+〉), it holds
that:
〈h0|h0〉 ≤ η
⇒ Re 〈f0,0|f1,1〉 ≤ η − 1
2
〈f0,0|f0,0〉 − 1
2
〈f1,1|f1,1〉 ≤ 0
⇒ Re2 〈f0,0|f1,1〉 ≥
(
1
2
〈f0,0|f0,0〉+ 1
2
〈f1,1|f1,1〉 − η
)2
⇒ | 〈f0,0|f1,1〉 |2 ≥
(
1
2
〈f0,0|f0,0〉+ 1
2
〈f1,1|f1,1〉 − η
)2
. (24)
(We see that η must be small enough so that the right hand side of the second
inequality is negative.)
Both of these two identities will be useful in the subsequent examples where
we bound η as a function of Q - the probability that A and B’s measurement
results differ - and pw - the probability that C sends the wrong message when
A and B both reflect (i.e., he sends “−1”); with Q = pw = 0 implying η = 0.
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4.2 Semi-Honest Center
In this first example, we will consider the case where C is semi-honest - that
is, he always follows the protocol exactly, preparing the correct state in step
one of the protocol, performing the correct measurement in step three, and
reporting, honestly, his measurement result. Beyond that, however, he is free to
do whatever he likes, for instance, he can listen in on the public communication
channel to try and gain additional information on the key. This is not only a
practically relevant scenario to analyze, but it also allows us to compare our
new key rate bound with our old from [14].
Besides the semi-honest sever, we will also assume a noisy quantum chan-
neled modeled using two independent depolarization channels, one for the for-
ward direction (qubits traveling from C to A and B) with parameter p, the other
for the reverse (qubits returning from A and B to C) with parameter q. That
is, if the joint qubit state is ρ (a density operator acting on a four dimensional
Hilbert space), then the depolarization channel with parameter p is:
Ep(ρ) = (1− p)ρ+ p
4
I,
where I is the identity operator. Furthermore, for the remainder of this sub-
section, we will relabel the Bell basis states as follows: |Φ+〉 = |φ0〉, |Φ−〉 = |φ1〉,
|Ψ+〉 = |φ2〉, and |Ψ−〉 = |φ3〉.
To compute a key rate bound, we need only compute a few parameters.
First are the probabilities that C sends “−1” if A and B measure and resend
the value |i, j〉 (i.e., we estimate the value 〈fi,j |fi,j〉). These are easy to compute
given our assumptions of a semi-honest server and depolarization channels. For
instance, if A and B measure and resend |0, 0〉, then the state arriving at C’s
lab is:
Eq(|0, 0〉 〈0, 0|) = (1− q) |0, 0〉 〈0, 0|+ q
4
∑
i,j∈{0,1}
|i, j〉 〈i, j| .
C now performs a Bell measurement of this system, with the message “−1”
being sent only if he measures |φ1〉 〈φ1| (i.e., |Φ−〉 〈Φ−|). It is easy to see that
the probability of him sending this message, given state Eq(|0, 0〉 〈0, 0|) is:
1− q
2
+
q
4
=
2− q
4
.
Thus 〈f0,0|f0,0〉 = (2 − q)/4. Using a similar process, the remaining 〈fi,j |fi,j〉
may be computed:
〈f0,0|f0,0〉 = 2− q
4
= 〈f1,1|f1,1〉 (25)
〈f0,1|f0,1〉 = q
4
= 〈f1,0|f1,0〉 . (26)
Next, we compute |αi,j |2 (the probability that A and B measure |i, j〉). Since
we are assuming C is semi-honest and thus he prepared |φ0〉 initially, these are
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computed using the state:
Ep(|φ0〉 〈φ0|) = (1− p) |φ0〉 〈φ0|+ p
4
3∑
i=0
|φi〉 〈φi| .
Clearly:
|α0,0|2 = 2− p
4
= |α1,1|2
|α0,1|2 = p
4
= |α1,0|2.
Thus, the value of p may be estimated by A and B using the observable
parameters |αi,j |2, while q can be estimated using the observable parameters
〈fi,j |fi,j〉. Furthermore, we have that Q, which is the probability that A and
B’s measurement results are different, is Q = |α0,1|2 + |α1,0|2 = p/2.
A and B are now able to compute pa, pC , and pW in terms of p and q. All
that remains is to bound | 〈f0,0|f1,1〉 |2. We will use our above discussion and
instead determine a value η such that 〈h0|h0〉 (which is the probability that C
sends “−1” if the joint state leaving A and B’s lab is |φ0〉) is upper bounded by
η.
In the general case, which we consider next, this value η can only be esti-
mated (since A and B are classical users, they cannot prepare a Bell state to
directly observe 〈h0|h0〉). However, given the assumptions in this sub-section,
they may in fact compute a value for η based on q. Indeed, if the state leaving
A and B is |φ0〉, then the system, when it reaches C, has evolved via:
Eq(|φ0〉 〈φ0|) = (1− q) |φ0〉 〈φ0|+ q
4
3∑
i=0
|φi〉 〈φi| .
Since C is semi-honest, he will only send “−1” if he measures |φ1〉. This prob-
ability is simply 〈h0|h0〉 = q/4 = η. We may now use Equation 23 to lower
bound the quantity | 〈f0,0|f1,1〉 |2.
Using these values and Equation 21, we see that the key rate of this mediated
protocol, in the event p = q = 2Q (i.e., the noise in the forward and reverse
channels is equivalent and the probability that A or B’s measurement results
are wrong is Q), remains positive for all Q ≤ 22.05% as shown in Figure 2. This
is an improvement over our original bound of Q ≤ 19.9%.
Note that, to achieve this high tolerance level in the presence of third-party
eavesdroppers, the classical channel connecting C to A or B needs to be au-
thenticated. This requirement is not necessary in the next scenario we consider
where C is fully adversarial.
4.3 Adversarial Server, Symmetric Attack
Of course the above section assumed C was semi-honest - that is he followed the
protocol exactly. Now, we assume the server C is adversarial. He is allowed to
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Figure 2: A graph of our key rate lower bound when the server C is semi-
honest and there is a noisy quantum channel, modeled by two independent
depolarization channels, connecting the users. This graph assumes the noise in
the forward direction (when the qubits travel from C to A and B) is equal to
the noise in the reverse (when qubits return from A and B to C). Observe that
the key rate remains positive for all Q ≤ 22.05%, where Q is the probability
that A and B’s measurement results differ.
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prepare any state he likes on step (1) of the protocol, and he may perform any
arbitrary operation (allowed by the laws of quantum physics) when the qubits
return to him, sending any message of his choice based on his operation. The
only assumption we make in this section is that C’s attack is symmetric in that
it can be parameterized by only a few parameters (to be discussed). We make
this assumption first, so that we can compare our new key rate bound with
our old one from [14] (which assumed a symmetric attack); and second, so that
we can better visualize the key rate bound by reducing the many parameters
to only a few. Note that in our original proof of security in [14], we assumed
throughout that C’s attack was symmetric (the key rate bound we derived there
was based on this assumption). In our new bound in this paper, however, we
made no such assumptions - Equation 21 works even in the most general case.
So, while assuming a symmetric attack is not required for our new proof in
this paper, it is easier to visualize our key rate bound and it also allows us to
compare our new results with our old.
The first assumption we make is that we may parameterize the values |αi,j |2
using only a single parameter Q. Namely, we have:
|α0,0|2 = 1−Q
2
= |α1,1|2
|α0,1|2 = Q
2
= |α1,0|2.
Next, we assume that the probability that C sends “−1” in the event A and
B measure |0, 0〉 is equal to the probability he sends that same message if they
both measure |1, 1〉. Similarly for the case |0, 1〉 and |1, 0〉. That is:
〈f0,0|f0,0〉 = 〈f1,1|f1,1〉 = F=
〈f0,1|f0,1〉 = 〈f1,0|f1,0〉 = F 6=
We make no assumptions regarding the comparative relationship between F=
and F 6=.
Using similar arguments as in [14] (in particular see Equation 25 from that
source, along with its derivation), we may find the following upper-bound on
〈h0|h0〉:
〈h0|h0〉 ≤
(√
1−Q (√QF 6= +√pw)
1−Q
)2
= η,
where pw is the probability that C sends the wrong message (namely “−1”) in
the event both A and B reflect.
This is our value for η allowing us to bound | 〈f0,0|f1,1〉 |2 using Equation 24
from the previous section. However, to evaluate this bound, we must determine
what to set F= and F6= to. Naturally, in practice, these values are simply
observed by A and B. However, for this paper, to evaluate our bound, we will
consider two examples.
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Figure 3: Showing a graph of our key rate lower bound when the server is
fully adversarial and when C’s attack is such that pa, the probability that any
particular iteration is accepted by A and B, is equal to 0.5, 0.4, and 0.3. Here,
Q represents the probability that A and B’s measurement results are different.
This is done to compare with our old bound from [14] (see text). Indeed, we see
that in all three cases, our new bound is superior. For instance, when pa = .5,
our new bound remains positive for all Q ≤ 12.5% whereas our old bound from
the previous paper remained positive only for Q ≤ 10.65%. The difference is
even more noticeable for smaller values of pa as mentioned in the text.
First, in order to compare with our previous bound from our original paper,
we will use F 6= = Q and:
F= = p˜a −Q
2
1−Q ,
where p˜a is the desired probability of acceptance. It is trivial to check that,
when setting these values thusly, we have pa = p˜a (see Equation 5). We have
to set this parameter this way since, in our original proof, we evaluated our
key rate equation assuming pa was 0.5, then 0.4, and finally 0.3 (our original
proof did not establish a clear relationship between the value of pa and the other
observed parameters as we did in this new proof).
Using these values, we see that, when Q = pw and p˜a = .5 the key rate
expression is positive for all Q ≤ 12.5%; when p˜a = .4 it is positive for Q ≤
10.8%; and for p˜a = .3 it remains positive for Q ≤ 8.86%. See Figure 3.
Compare this with our old bound from [14] - there, when p˜a = .5 our old bound
remained positive for Q ≤ 10.65%, while for p˜a = .3, the old bound was positive
only for Q ≤ 5.25%.
The second example we consider is based on values determined from the
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Figure 4: Showing a graph of our key rate lower bound when the server is fully
adversarial and when C’s attack is such that certain parameters agree with
the depolarization example (see text). Here, Q represents the probability that
A and B’s measurement results are different. Note that the key rate remains
positive for all Q ≤ 13.04%.
depolarization channel example in the previous section. We will assume the noise
in both channels is equal. In that case, we have F6= = Q/2 while F= = 1/2−Q/2
(see Equations 25 and 26 and recall that Q = 2p = 2q).
Using these values, we see that, when Q = pw, the key rate remains positive
for all Q ≤ 13.04%. See Figure 4.
For comparison, BB84 can tolerate up to 11% error while the six-state BB84
can tolerate up to 12.6% (both bounds without pre-processing since we have not
considered pre-processing in our proof) [15, 21]. B92 [24] was recently shown to
tolerate up to 6.5% error assuming a depolarization channel [25].
We stress that, in practice, there is no need to make such assumptions to
determine F= and F 6=: these are parameters that are observed directly. We
made assumptions only to visualize our key rate bound and to compare it with
our previous work.
5 Conclusion
We have provided a new proof of security for the mediated semi-quantum key
distribution protocol presented in [14]. While a proof of security was provided in
that original source, we have demonstrated that our new key rate bound provides
a more optimistic rate. Indeed we see that in every scenario considered, our new
proof demonstrates that the tolerated noise level of the protocol (the maximal
amount of noise before A and B should abort) is strictly larger than the old key
rate bound. Our new proof also does not make any assumptions about the attack
22
used by C. Note that, while we only evaluated our key rate bound in two specific
examples - the semi-honest case and the symmetric adversarial case - our proof
works in even the most general of scenarios (i.e., a non-symmetric adversarial
attack). Our work in this paper has shown that this mediated SQKD protocol
can tolerate noise levels surpassing the maximal tolerated noise thresholds of
many other fully quantum protocols. Finally, the proof technique we used may
hold utility in security proofs of other protocols (quantum or semi-quantum)
which rely on a two-way quantum communication channel.
Many open problems remain. Most important, perhaps, is that we consid-
ered only the perfect qubit scenario; dealing with problems such as multi-photon
attacks is an interesting area of research (in any two-way quantum protocol).
Also, can a mediated SQKD protocol be designed that is more efficient - recall
that, in the absence of noise and with an honest server, only half of the sent
qubits can contribute to the raw key. Finally, can a mediated SQKD protocol
be designed without the need for C to prepare and measure in the Bell basis. As
mentioned in [14], the answer to this seems to be positive, however the security
proof is more involved. Perhaps the techniques we developed and used in this
paper can be adapted towards this goal.
References
[1] Charles H Bennett and Gilles Brassard. Quantum cryptography: Public
key distribution and coin tossing. In Proceedings of IEEE International
Conference on Computers, Systems and Signal Processing, volume 175.
New York, 1984.
[2] Valerio Scarani, Helle Bechmann-Pasquinucci, Nicolas J. Cerf, Miloslav
Dusˇek, Norbert Lu¨tkenhaus, and Momtchil Peev. The security of practical
quantum key distribution. Rev. Mod. Phys., 81:1301–1350, Sep 2009.
[3] Michel Boyer, D. Kenigsberg, and T. Mor. Quantum key distribution with
classical bob. In Quantum, Nano, and Micro Technologies, 2007. ICQNM
’07. First International Conference on, pages 10–10, 2007.
[4] Michel Boyer, Ran Gelles, Dan Kenigsberg, and Tal Mor. Semiquantum
key distribution. Phys. Rev. A, 79:032341, Mar 2009.
[5] Wang Jian, Zhang Sheng, Zhang Quan, and Tang Chao-Jing. Semiquan-
tum key distribution using entangled states. Chinese Physics Letters,
28(10):100301, 2011.
[6] Kun-Fei Yu, Chun-Wei Yang, Ci-Hong Liao, and Tzonelih Hwang. Authen-
ticated semi-quantum key distribution protocol using bell states. Quantum
Information Processing, pages 1–9, 2014.
[7] W.O. Krawec. Restricted attacks on semi-quantum key distribution proto-
cols. Quantum Information Processing, 13(11):2417–2436, 2014.
23
[8] Hua Lu and Qing-Yu Cai. Quantum key distribution with classical alice.
International Journal of Quantum Information, 6(06):1195–1202, 2008.
[9] Zhi-Wei Sun, Rui-Gang Du, and Dong-Yang Long. Quantum key distribu-
tion with limited classical bob. International Journal of Quantum Infor-
mation, 11(01), 2013.
[10] Takayuki Miyadera. Relation between information and disturbance in quan-
tum key distribution protocol with classical alice. Int. J. of Quantum In-
formation, 9, 2011.
[11] Walter O Krawec. Security proof of a semi-quantum key distribution pro-
tocol. to appear: IEEE ISIT 2015; arXiv preprint arXiv:1412.0282, 2015.
[12] Xiangfu Zou, Daowen Qiu, Lvzhou Li, Lihua Wu, and Lvjun Li.
Semiquantum-key distribution using less than four quantum states. Phys.
Rev. A, 79:052312, May 2009.
[13] Walter O Krawec. Semi-Quantum Key Distribution. PhD thesis, Stevens
Institute of Technology, May 2015.
[14] Walter O Krawec. Mediated semiquantum key distribution. Physical Re-
view A, 91(3):032323, 2015.
[15] Renato Renner, Nicolas Gisin, and Barbara Kraus. Information-theoretic
security proof for quantum-key-distribution protocols. Phys. Rev. A,
72:012332, Jul 2005.
[16] Jop Brie¨t and Peter Harremoe¨s. Properties of classical and quantum jensen-
shannon divergence. Physical review A, 79(5):052311, 2009.
[17] Matthias Christandl, Renato Renner, and Artur Ekert. A generic secu-
rity proof for quantum key distribution. arXiv preprint quant-ph/0402131,
2004.
[18] Hoi-Kwong Lo, Hoi-Fung Chau, and M Ardehali. Efficient quantum key
distribution scheme and a proof of its unconditional security. Journal of
Cryptology, 18(2):133–165, 2005.
[19] E.B. Davies and J.T. Lewis. An operational approach to quantum proba-
bility. Communications in Mathematical Physics, 17(3):239–260, 1970.
[20] Igor Devetak and Andreas Winter. Distillation of secret key and entangle-
ment from quantum states. Proceedings of the Royal Society A: Mathemat-
ical, Physical and Engineering Science, 461(2053):207–235, 2005.
[21] B. Kraus, N. Gisin, and R. Renner. Lower and upper bounds on the secret-
key rate for quantum key distribution protocols using one-way classical
communication. Phys. Rev. Lett., 95:080501, Aug 2005.
24
[22] Matthias Christandl, Robert Konig, and Renato Renner. Postselection
technique for quantum channels with applications to quantum cryptogra-
phy. Phys. Rev. Lett., 102:020504, Jan 2009.
[23] Renato Renner. Symmetry of large physical systems implies independence
of subsystems. Nature Physics, 3(9):645–649, 2007.
[24] Charles H. Bennett. Quantum cryptography using any two nonorthogonal
states. Phys. Rev. Lett., 68:3121–3124, May 1992.
[25] Ryutaroh Matsumoto. Improved asymptotic key rate of the b92 proto-
col. In Information Theory Proceedings (ISIT), 2013 IEEE International
Symposium on, pages 351–353. IEEE, 2013.
25
